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Abstract
We examine both grants and net loans made to low income countries during the
last two decades to understand the main reasons that motivated the behaviour of
both donors and creditors. We ﬁnd that the total amount of net transfers to HIPCs,
as compared to non-HIPCs, have been increasing with their debt level. Greater
net transfers have taken the form of net loans from multilateral organisations and
grants in exchange for loans from bilateral institutions. This evidence thus suggests
that HIPCs have kept receiving large amounts of resources just because of their
high indebtedness, thereby supporting both the hypothesis of defensive lending and
defensive granting.
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11 Introduction
Since the onset of the debt crises in 1982, while the debt situation of middle-income
countries has improved signiﬁcantly and many of them have been able to re-enter the in-
ternational capital market, low income countries have continued to experience diﬃculties
meeting their external debt-service obligations. Since 1988, Paris Club creditors recog-
nised that most low-income countries required an actual reduction of their level of debt,
more than repeated reschedulings on “standard terms.” Thus, conditional on the adop-
tion of an IMF adjustment programme, most of low-income countries reschedulings were
made at concessional terms (they contained a grant element either in the principal or in
the interest component). At the same time, concessional new loans were made by both
bilateral and multilateral sources. (Low-income countries are listed in Table 1)
In September 1996, in order to deal with the speciﬁc problems of the most indebted
and poorest countries (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries or HIPCs), the World Bank and
the IMF have jointly proposed and implemented the so-called HIPCs Debt Initiative which
aims at reducing the debt burdens of all eligible HIPCs to sustainable levels, provided
that they adopt and pursue strong programmes of adjustment and reform. More recently,
in 1999, the HIPCs Initiative has been enhanced with the aim of providing deeper and
more rapid debt relief to a larger number of countries. (HIPCs are listed in Table 3).
In this paper we examine both grants and net loans, that is new loans net of total
debt service (i.e. principal and interest payments) made to low income countries over
the last two decades, to understand the main reasons that motivated the behaviour of
both donors and creditors. We focus on HIPCs since they received the most generous
treatment so far (see Easterly, 2002). In particular, we want to examine whether this
continued transfers of resources has been motivated by humanitarian reasons or by the
hope of stimulating development, say, by conditioning new loans and grants to the quality
of policy and institutions, or by defensive lending aimed at avoiding default. The latter
hypothesis has been recently advanced by Devarajan et al. (1999) and by Birdsall et al.
(2002).1 In fact, the decision of both bilateral and especially multilateral organisations
(chieﬂy the IMF, the World Bank and the Regional Development Banks) to extend loans
and provide new resources to HIPCs cannot be explained by liquidity arguments, as the
sustainability of their external debts was already recognized to be the problem in 1988.
Few papers deals with the determinants of net oﬃcial (and generally concessional)
loans to low income developing countries despite a vast literature on foreign aid. Birdsall
et al. (2002) investigate the factors that explain multilateral and bilateral net transfers,
deﬁned as the sum of grants and loans net of interest and principal repayments. Analysing
a panel of 37 Sub-Saharan countries over the period 1978 to 1998, the authors ﬁnd that
net transfers were higher in poorer and smaller countries. However, the quality of their
economic policy mattered little in explaining net transfers, as donors, especially bilaterals,
made greater transfers to countries with high multilateral debt, despite their bad policies.
1As stressed by Devarajan et.al (1999), 30% of aid in the period 1975-99 has been used to service the
external debt.
2We examine the determinants of grants and net loans separately unlike Birdsall et al.
(2002) who focus on aggregate net transfers (i.e. the sum of both net loans and grants).
Indeed, despite multilateral and bilateral net loans to HIPCs are, in most cases, conces-
sional and, as such, a part of aid, oﬃcial net loans are substantially diﬀerent from grants,
if anything because loans unlike grants must be repaid. This distinction and the use of a
dynamic panel allow us to reach diﬀerent conclusions regarding the behaviour of bilateral
and multilateral institutions. Finally, our larger sample of low-income countries, made
of both HIPCs and non-HIPCs, allows us to introduce a control group in the empirical
analysis and thus to test whether the positive relation of net loans and grants with the
debt ratio found by Birdsall et al. arises because of ”defensive lending” or because of
humanitarian reasons.
We innovate on the empirical literature on foreign aid in three respects. First, by
introducing “debt variables” among the donors’ interest type of variables, we are able to
assess their inﬂuence in the aid (and net loans) allocation choices (i.e. both the hypothesis
of “defensive lending” and that of “defensive granting”). Secondly, we separate between
net loans and grants, bearing in mind that they are alternative ways to allocate scarce
resources to low income countries. Finally, we distinguish loans by type of creditor in order
to examine whether the behaviour of donors and creditors is aﬀected by the decisions of
the other creditors and donors, an important aspect that has so far been neglected.
We empirically investigate whether a high debt and its composition by type of creditor
played an important role in explaining the allocation of grants and net loans to HIPCs
while controlling for their characteristics and economic performance. Speciﬁcally, our
hypothesis is that net loans and grants have continued to ﬂow from rich countries to poor
ones with the main objective of making poor countries able to keep servicing their debt
while the quality of their policy framework has mattered little.
We ﬁnd that a higher level of bilateral debt reduces bilateral net loans to HIPCs,
while multilateral creditors appear strikingly more generous with HIPCs than with non-
HIPCs. In particular, while a higher stock of debt owed to multilateral creditors tends
to reduce the amount of their loans to non-HIPCs, this eﬀect disappears in the case of
HIPCs. The amount of loans, that the HIPCs receive, increases, compared to non-HIPCs,
with the level of multilateral debt. This evidence points to defensive lending as the main
motivation for the behaviour of multilateral organizations.
The aid policy of both bilateral and multilateral donors also appears more generous
with HIPC than with non-HIPC countries, in that the amount of grants that each donor
type provides to HIPCs signiﬁcantly increases, compared to non-HIPCs, with its corre-
sponding debt share. This suggests that a concern for debt sustainability might motivate
the aid policy of both bilateral and multilateral donors, thereby supporting the hypothesis
of ”defensive granting”.
Finally, as the aid additionality issue is concerned, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
of debt forgiveness in the bilateral grants equation, independently of the type of country
considered, which is a cause of concern as it is likely to reduce the amount of resources
3available to all low-income countries.2
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present some descriptive evidence
on net loans and grants while Section 3 develops the empirical framework. Section 4
presents the results and Section 5 ﬁnally concludes.
2 Loans and grants: descriptive evidence
Over the last three decades, the debt-to-GDP ratio of Highly Indebted Poor Countries has
steadily increased until the implementation of the HIPCs Initiative. The evolution of the
HIPCs debt ratio is shown in Figure 1 (which compares it with the debt ratio evolution of
all developing and of all low-income countries). This increase in debt ratios is well known
and overly stressed in editorials calling for a solution of the debt-poverty trap aﬄicting
African countries.
However, an economist not familiar with external debt problems may be puzzled by
the rise in debt ratios between 1988 and 1994, as this occurred at a time when bilateral
oﬃcial creditors pledged to reduce the burden of poor debtor countries under the “Toronto
terms” (1988), ”London terms” (1991) and “Naples terms” (1994). If traditional debt
relief agreements did reduce the net present value of debtors obligations, the eﬀective
relief was, however, modest and certainly below expectations.3 More importantly, debt
relief was more than compensated by a greater amount of new borrowing. Actual ﬁgures
show that in the period 1989 to 1999 total debt forgiveness was about $35 billions while
in the same period new borrowing reached $53 billions.
Figure 1: Total External Debt % GDP. 1970-99.
Even more puzzling is the claim that debt service (interest payments and redemption
of maturing debt) is draining resources out of the debtor countries precluding development
opportunities and throwing thousands of people into deep poverty. How could repayments
be so large and debt growing so fast?
The relevant issue is whether resources have been moved away from the indebted
countries to their international creditors (negative transfers) or resources have continued
to ﬂow into and beneﬁt these countries (positive transfers). To estimate the net transfers
that debtor countries have received over the years we must examine the evolution of
new loans (disbursements) and then subtract the ﬂows of debt service payments (interest
and principal repayments). In fact, simply looking at the debt-to-GDP ratio could be
misleading as debt may rise for several diﬀerent reasons. A debt increase could reﬂect:
(i) the transformation of interests payments into debt (that is, interests capitalized and
interest arrears); (ii) the eﬀect of cross-currency valuations and; (iii) the debt ratio could
2The hypothesis of ”aid additionality” has been raised in recent studies of the HIPCs initiative and
basically consists in a trade oﬀ between debt reduction and new aid (see Cohen, 2001).
3The net present value (NPV) of debt is deﬁned as the sum of all future debt-service obligations
(interest and principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate.
4also increase because of a fall in GDP that, when measured in dollars, is not a rare event
for the countries under consideration.
In what follows, we focus on the evolution of net loans, that is, on the diﬀerence
between new loans (i.e. disbursements) and total debt service (i.e. principal and interest
repayments). We call this diﬀerence net loans instead of net transfers (which is the
deﬁnition in the Global Development Finance) to emphasize that net loans do not include
grants, which are the other important source of funds to the HIPCs. The period of time we
consider goes from 1970 to 1999. Figure 2 shows that total debt service has been steadily
increasing throughout this period but net loans have been positive, though declining,
until 1997. Therefore, until 1997 (with the exceptions of 1994) new loans have been high
enough to make indebted countries able to service their debt. It is only since 1998, that
aggregate net loans turn out to be negative, thus providing support to the claim that
the service of the outstanding debt is draining resources out of poor countries precluding
development opportunities.
Figure 2: Total Debt Service and Total Net Loans % GDP. HIPCs. 1970-99
A full picture of net resource ﬂows from the international lending community to the
HIPCs also requires examining grants, which represent the most important component
of foreign aid and a clear alternative to net loans as a source of funding for the HIPCs.4
Figure 3 presents the evolution of grants (with and without technical cooperation) along
with the evolution of both total and long-term net loans.5 Over the last two decades,
grants have clearly been the most important funds to the HIPCs. While grants roughly
followed the same pattern of net loans until the early eighties, they kept rising until the
mid nineties. This steady increase thus compensated the fall in net loans over the period
between 1984 and 1997, making stable the “total resources inﬂow”.
Figure 3: Total Net Loans and Grants % GDP. HIPCs. 1970-99
Finally, both grants and net loans decreased quite markedly after 1997. As shown in
Figure 4, when grants (without technical cooperation) are added to net loans, their sum
is always positive (while total net loans have been negative in 1994 and in 1998-99) and
comprised in a range between 4 and 8 percent of GDP. In particular, Figure 4 shows that
the amount of resources transferred to the HIPCs had been relatively stable in terms of
GDP until the second half of the nineties, when net transfers fell substantially.
Figure 4: Total Net Loans & w/o TC Grants and Total Net Loans % GDP. HIPCs.
1970-99
Hence, in the nineties, while net loans fell substantially, and became negative since
4Foreign aid is usually associated with Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA), which includes both
oﬃcial grants and oﬃcial concessional loans (that is loans with at least a 25% percent grant component).
ODA statistics are produced by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. In turn,
ODA can be divided into a bilateral and a multilateral component, which accounts for about 2/3 and
1/3 of all the resources, respectively (see Renard and Cassimon, 2001).
5Technical assistance relates to short and long-term experts from the donor countries working in
developing countries, scholarship programmes and some other forms of human capital contributions.
51998, the total resources transferred to the HIPCs (i.e. the sum of net loans and grants)
remained positive. This fact raises the issue of whether grants can substitute normal
money transfers. This mainly depends on the fungibility of (non technical) grants. The
quality of grants, from the point of view of the recipients, is certainly lower than their
monetary value, but a number of studies show that, though not completely, grants are
a highly fungible source of ﬁnancing (Devarajan et al., 1999). The reason is that grants
tend to ﬁnance projects of high priority and thus they free resources from the budget for
other uses.
To provide further insight, net loans can be distinguished by type of creditor. To this
end, we focus on the distribution of long-term net loans, since the Global Development
Finance provides disaggregated data only for this type of loans. Long-term net loans to
the HIPCs, disaggregated by type of creditor, are displayed in Figure 5.6 Both bilateral
and private net loans started decreasing since the beginning of the eighties. While private
net loans were negative throughout the whole period, bilateral net loans became negative
in the mid nineties. Until 1997 positive long-term net loans to the HIPCs were ensured
by multilateral organisations. International ﬁnancial institutions played a crucial role in
maintaining a positive ﬂow of funds to the HIPCs.
Figure 5: Long-Term Net Loans % GDP by type of creditor. HIPCs. 1970-99
Since the early nineties, transfers to the HIPCs have mainly taken the form of grants.
Diﬀerently from the data on grants presented above (which come from the GDF database)
Figure 6 shows the data on grants disaggregated by type of donor, which are provided by
the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, as the GDF does not contain such
distinction.7 Both bilateral and multilateral grants have been rising since the seventies,
but bilateral grants have been increasingly higher than multilateral grants throughout the
whole period. Figure 6 also shows that grants started to decrease in 1995 (which looks
like further evidence of no-additionality) while multilateral grants began to rise again in
1998.
Evidence on net loans and grants clearly shows that bilateral creditors, unlike private
creditors who pulled out from HIPCs, have switched from loans to grants. Figure 6 shows
that bilateral grants have continued to ﬂow into these countries, thereby compensating
for the fall of net loans. As debt service payments started exceeding new loans in 1994,
this pattern suggests that bilateral grants may have freed resources to be used for the
repayment of the bilateral debt.
Figure 6: Grants % GDP by type of donors. HIPCs. 1970-99
Interestingly, among the alternative sources of funds to the HIPCs only net loans by
multilateral creditors have been growing over the whole period. The increasing involve-
ment of multilateral organisations in the debt of the HIPCs is evident from Figure 7 which
shows that the rising debt held by the multilaterals substituted the debt held by other
6As data on IMF net loans were not originally included in the long term multilateral net loans we had
to add them to the series.
7Data on grants from DAC include both technical cooperation grants and debt relief.
6creditors (however, bilateral debt still accounts for half of the total). This descriptive
evidence conﬁrms what claimed by Easterly (2001, 2002), namely that the HIPCs debt
crisis developed because of the expansion of oﬃcial lending. Oﬃcial lenders did not seem
to follow the same prudential rules as private capital, which pulled out of the HIPCs and
they may have given new loans to actually enable the old loans to be paid back.
Figure 7: Long-Term External Debt % GDP by type of creditor. HIPCs. 1970-99
This evidence raises the issue of what motivated the increasing involvement of multi-
lateral organisations in the HIPCs debt problem. Humanitarian reasons certainly provide
a possible explanation. A second explanation is that a substitution of multilateral for
bilateral debt may increase the leverage of the international community on the HIPCs.
Indeed, multilateral loans are conditional on the adoption of reforms and adjustment pro-
grammes and multilateral organisations are senior creditors because default on their debt
may lead to the exclusion from future lending and from other forms of aid. Finally, the
behaviour of multilateral creditors can be explained by ”defensive lending”. Multilateral
organisations may have intervened with the main goal of avoiding default and thus the
“embarrassment” of losses in their budgets and failure of aid policy.
3 A Model of Net Loans and Grants Determination
The descriptive evidence presented in the second section clearly suggests that the lending
activity of governments and multilateral organisations to the HIPCs cannot be explained
w i t h o u taj o i n ta n a l y s i so fa i dc o n c e s s i o n . M o r ei m p o r t a n t l y ,i ta p p e a r st h a tt h eb e -
haviour of multilateral organisations (in the aggregate) is aﬀected by the behaviour of
the other major lenders, be they private or public. In particular, since the early 1980s,
the continuous drop out of private and bilateral creditors has been oﬀset by an increasing
involvement of multilateral organisations in lending to the HIPCs. Bilateral and multilat-
eral grants have also ﬂowed into these countries, at least until the mid nineties, apparently
to make up for the shrinking channel of bilateral credit.
This evidence leads us to examine whether there is a link between net loans and
grants to the HIPCs and between the decisions of bilateral and multilateral creditors. In
particular, we want to study the interactions between the lending and granting decisions
of multilateral and bilateral creditors, a theme that has so far received scant attention
in the empirical literature, despite the central role that it should play in the “defensive
lending” hypothesis. Moreover, if such hypothesis were empirically relevant, we would
expect that net loans and grants were motivated not only by the level of debt but also by
t h ea m o u n to fd e b to w e dt oe a c hc r e d i t o r .
In the following analysis we examine the behaviour of grants and long-term loans
net of principal and interest repayments from bilateral creditors and from multilateral
creditors for the period 1982 to 1999. The reason we focus on this period is that the debt
crisis of the early 1980s arguably marked a shift in regime. Data on loans are from Global
7Development Finance (GDF) statistics of the World Bank; data on grants disaggregated
by type of donors come from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD
and include technical cooperation.
Our deﬁnition of net loans is equal to “net ﬂows” (i.e. the change in the external
debt) in the GDF deﬁnition minus interest payments. This aggregate gives the amount
of disbursements that are left to the HIPCs once they have paid for the service of their
debts. Thus, we take into account the fact that most of the new credit ﬂows back to the
creditors in the form of interest and principal repayments. As we abstract from any gross
lending made with the purpose of allowing the HIPCs to fulﬁl their maturing liabilities,
we take for granted this kind of defensive lending and investigate whether more indebted
countries get even greater support on top of this.
Finally, we conﬁne our attention to long-term net loans, since the GDF database
does not provide any information on creditors of short-term loans. However, we believe
that long-term loans are fairly representative of the aggregate behaviour, since short-term
loans have been a small share of total loans for the period under investigation.
We estimate a dynamic panel of 52 low-income countries for the period 1982 to 1999
with both country-speciﬁce ﬀects and time eﬀects. The sample includes 39 HIPC countries
and a control group of other 13 low-income countries. This allows us to test for possible
diﬀerences in the lending and granting behaviour of oﬃcial institutions toward HIPC
countries relative to non-HIPC countries. We had to exclude Somalia and Vietnam from
the group of 41 HIPCs because of data availability in the former case and inconsistency
between stocks and ﬂows in the latter. Data availability has also limited the non-HIPC
group to 13 countries, out of the 68 low-income countries listed in Table 1.
We choose a dynamic speciﬁcation —i.e. we include a lag of the dependent variable
among the regressors— to account for the short run dynamics of net loans and grants. The
dynamic speciﬁcation allows for a correct estimation of the eﬀect of high levels of debt by
controlling for the autocorrelation of net loans and grants.
The estimated equations for net loans and grants are as follows:
L
j
i,t = b0 + b1L
j
i,t−1 + b2Li,t−1 + b3Bi,t−1 + b4Gi,t−1 + (1)
b5Zi,t−1 + b6Ci + b7Tt
G
j
i,t = c0 + c1G
j
i,t−1 + c2Gi,t−1 + c3Bi,t−1 + c4Li,t−1 + (2)
c5Zi,t−1 + c6Ci + c7Tt + c8Fi,t−1
where L
j
i,t denotes net long-term loans (relative to GDP) to country i from creditor j (i.e.
bilateral or multilateral creditors) and Li,t−1 is the vector of long-term net loans from
the other creditors (i.e. private creditors and bilateral or multilateral creditors). The
variable G
j
i,t denotes grants (relative to GDP) to country i from donor j (i.e. bilateral or
multilateral grants) and Gi,t the grants from the other donor. Therefore we consider the
interactions between creditors’ decisions and between loans and grants.
8To examine the relation between aid policy and indebtedness, we consider the stock
of long-term debt (relative to GDP) owed to bilateral, multilateral and private creditors
and enter the three types of debt separately; i.e. Bi,t−1 is the vector of the stocks of
long-term debt held by multilateral, bilateral and private creditors.
To control for the fact that grants partly includes debt reductions, in the bilateral
and multilateral grant equations we add the amount of ODA debt forgiveness (relative to
GDP), Fi,t−1.T h i sv a r i a b l ea l s op r o v i d e se v i d e n c eo na i da d d i t i o n a l i t y .
In order to distinguish the ”defensive lending” hypothesis from other motivations for
providing loans and grants, we consider as explanatory variables the set of variables Zi,t−1
suggested by the literature on aid and loans concession. Following the distinction made
by Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weber (2002), we include variables that
should account for the recipients’ needs and the quality of their policy and institutions.
The set Zt−1 include (previous year) economic performance measured with the rate of
inﬂation, GDP growth, and openness (constructed as the ratio of the sum of imports and
exports to GDP). We also add population to the regressors, as in the aid literature it is
usually found that countries with a higher population receive less aid, probably because
a i di sm o r ee ﬀective when given to small countries.
These variables should actually matter both in the case loans and aid were motivated
by humanitarian reasons and they would also be relevant if loans and grants were given
to enhance the eﬀectiveness of aid in stimulating development. In the latter case aid and
loans are expected to positively depend on past economic performance (i.e. good policies)
and on the quality of institutions. But low growth or high inﬂation could also lead to
higher loans and grants if the latter were motivated by humanitarian reasons. To account
for a rise of aid in post-war periods, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of
one during the years following a conﬂict for a maximum of four years.8
As for the quality of institutions we consider the index of “Political Rights and Civil
Liberties” (PCRL) and the indexes of Investment Proﬁl e ,L a wa n dO r d e r ,C o r r u p t i o n
and Bureaucracy Quality from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Investment
Proﬁle represents risks to investment that are not covered by the other political, economic
and ﬁnancial ICRG risk component; Law refers to the impartiality of the legal system
while Order concerns the popular observance of the law; Corruption is assessment of
corruption within the political system, which, among other consequences, represents a
threat to foreign investment; ﬁnally, Bureaucracy Quality is an assessment of whether the
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or
interruption of the public service. For both PRCL and the four ICRG indexes the higher
the score the better the proﬁle.9 As the ICRG indexes are available only for a subset of 38
countries, and only for the 1984 to 1999 period, we estimated our model both excluding
and including such indexes.
8Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002) claim that aid would be considerably more eﬀective in augmenting growth
in post-conﬂict situations than in other situations.
9The Political Rights and Civil Liberties index values have been multiplied by (-1) as, originally, the
higher the score the lower the liberties.
9The countries dummies Ci are used to control for country speciﬁc characteristics.
We also expect them to capture motivations related to donors’ political and strategic
interests, which are traditional in the aid literature, such as colonial past, religion, ethnic
and geographic variables (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 2002). Finally, Tt is a set of time
dummies. Tables 4 and 5 contain all the details on our variable deﬁnitions and sources.
To understand whether a possibly positive relation of net loans and grants with
the debt-to-GDP ratio arises because of ”defensive lending and granting” or because of
humanitarian reasons, we test whether this relation for HIPC countries is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent than in the case of other low-income countries. We do so by interacting the
debts (relative to GDP) owed to bilateral, multilateral and private creditors with the
dummy Hi which takes the value of one in the case of a HIPC country. In particular,
under the hypothesis of defensive lending (or defensive granting) the amount of loans (or
grants), that a given creditor is willing to provide, should increase with the stock of debt
held.10
In principle, the behaviour of oﬃcial creditors and donors may diﬀer between HIPCs
and non-HIPCs also relative to the other variables in equations (1) and (2). We tested
the hypothesis that the interactions of the dummy Hi with the other regressors were zero
and could not reject it except for the lagged dependent variable in the grant equation
(2) for both bilateral and multilateral grants, and in the case of output growth in the
multilateral grant equation. However, in the latter case, considering a diﬀerent eﬀect for
HIPCs does neither aﬀect the overall explanatory power of output growth nor the values
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3.1 The estimation method
We adopt a GLS ﬁxed eﬀect estimator in order to control for countries unobservables and
to correct for heteroskedasticity across countries. To account for the short run dynamics of
net loans and grants we include a lag of the dependent variable among the regressors. The
dynamic speciﬁcation allows for a correct estimation of the eﬀect of high levels of debt by
controlling for the autocorrelation of net loans and grants. Indeed, a strong dependence
of net loans and grants from the level of debt in the static speciﬁcation might actually
10The dummy for HIPCs cannot enter separately in the regressions because of the presence of country-
speciﬁce ﬀects.
10reﬂect the autocorrelation of loans and grants that are typically disbursed in a number
of installments over time. Without correcting for the short run dynamics, a correlation
between net loans and debt could reﬂect a common deterministic trend. The evidence
we provide on the importance of defensive lending is thus robust to the latter problem
that appears to aﬀect other results in the literature (see e.g. Frey and Schneider 1986
and Birdsall et al. 2002). The time dummies capture the contemporaneous correlations
across countries.
In a typical panel, which has vastly more individuals than time periods, the inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable would introduce a bias since the dependent variable, and
thus the lagged dependent variable (a right hand regressor), are functions of the individual
speciﬁc component of the error term. Nickell (1981) shows that in the AR(1) case the bias
in estimating a dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects model becomes less important as T grows. Judson
a n dO w e n( 1 9 9 9 )t e s tt h ep e r f o r m a n c eo ft h eﬁxed eﬀects estimator by means of Monte
Carlo simulations, concentrating on panels with typical macroeconomic dimensions, i.e.
small N and T. Their analysis suggest that the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator performs well when
T=30, i.e. with a T dimension fairly similar to ours. Moreover, with T =18 and N =52
our panel can be considered a typical macro panel.
The ﬁxed eﬀects assumes homoskedasticity and if the assumption is not met then
the estimates will be ineﬃcient. A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test was
performed on the residuals of the baseline model estimated by OLS. The test is chi-squared
distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom, where N is the number of groups in the sample,
52 countries in our case. The result of the test led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity across groups for both net loans and grants regressions.
Baltagi and Li (1995) suggest an LM test for serial correlation in ﬁxed eﬀects models
where the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics is calculated for large T. Under
two alternative assumptions for the error autocorrelation structure (i.e. an AR(1) and a
MA(1)) the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the disturbance is rejected in two
equations out of four. In any case, the size of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient is negligible for
all equations. Hence, we decided not to correct for the autocorrorrelations in the residuals




We estimate our panel of 52 countries for the period 1982 to 1999 by GLS with country-
speciﬁce ﬀects and time eﬀects. The hypotheses of not signiﬁcance of country dummies
and time dummies were indeed rejected at any reasonable signiﬁcance level, as shown in
Table 6 and 7.
11The results of the estimation of equation (3) for both bilateral and multilateral net
loans (relative to GDP) are presented in Table 6. As expected, net loans are rather
persistent, while most variables related to recipients’ needs and economic performance
are, in general, not signiﬁcant. The eﬀects of GDP growth and openness vary depending
on the type of creditor considered. For instance, column 1 of Table 6 shows that a poor
performance, as measured by a low GDP growth, signiﬁcantly increases net loans from
bilateral creditors at the 5% level. Larger ﬂows of bilateral loans to low-growth countries
can be explained by the greater needs of the recipients. Loans from bilateral creditors are
also positively and signiﬁcantly aﬀected, though at the 10% level, by the openness of the
receiving country, an indication of the importance of commercial ties and/or the ability
to service the external debt.
Interestingly, and consistently with other results in the literature, economic perfor-
mance does appear to play a role in multilateral lending.11 Column 3 shows that GDP
growth has a positive eﬀect on multilateral loans and this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the
5% level. By contrast, openness does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect multilateral loans. Finally,
both bilateral and multilateral loans are neither aﬀected by ”Political Rights and Civil
Liberties” nor by per-capita GDP. A “post war” dummy is also not signiﬁcant in both
regressions, showing that loans from either source are not substantially higher in the four
years following the end of a conﬂict.
The important evidence concerns the eﬀect of the debt (relative to GDP), that we
divide into bilateral, multilateral and private debt depending on the type of the holder. As
we focus on the behavior of bilateral creditors, column 1 shows that in the case of countries
which are not HIPCs (for which debt sustainability is not a problem) the coeﬃcients on
t h ed e b tr a t i o sa r ea l ln e g a t i v eb u tn o ts i g n i ﬁcant. In the case of HIPCs, instead, a higher
debt owed to bilateral creditors signiﬁcantly reduces their net loans: the coeﬃcient on the
variable that interacts the bilateral debt with the dummy for being a HIPC is negative
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Therefore, bilateral creditors clearly reduce their loans as
their debt exposure increases and signiﬁcantly so in the case of highly indebted countries.
Importantly, a credit restrain is induced by a higher stock of bilateral debt, while the
amount of debt held by multilateral and private creditors does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
behaviour of bilateral creditors.
A completely diﬀerent picture emerges as we look at the lending policy of multilateral
creditors, in column 3. In fact, multilateral organisations are strikingly more generous
with high-debt countries than with low-debt countries. More speciﬁcally, the amount of
loans given to non-HIPCs falls as the debt owed to multilateral organisation increases,
as shown by a coeﬃcient on multilateral debt that is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. This eﬀect disappears in the case of HIPCs: the coeﬃcient of the variable that
interacts multilateral debt with a dummy for being HIPC is positive and signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. This eﬀect is quantitatively important: a 10% increase of multilateral debt
11Burnside and Dollar (2000), for example, ﬁnd that the quality of a country’s policy has only a
small impact on the allocation of aid, at least for bilateral donors which seem more respondent to donor
interests. On the contrary, multilateral aid is allocated to countries with better policies.
12in terms of GDP across all countries reduces net loans to non-HIPCs by 0.4% of GDP
( m o r et h a ni td o e sw i t hH I P C s )i nt h es h o r tr u na n db y0 . 9 %o fG D Pi nt h el o n gr u n .
This non-linear relation between multilateral loans and multilateral debt suggests
that, at high levels of debt, the lending policy of multilateral creditors is motivated by a
concern for debt sustainability and strongly supports the hypothesis of defensive lending.
More importantly, debt ownership appears to be an important determinant of the lending
decisions of multilateral creditors. Indeed, their loans to HIPCs signiﬁcantly increase with
the stock of multilateral debt, while the impact of both bilateral and private debt is not
signiﬁcant. This evidence clearly points to defensive lending as the main motivation for the
behavior of multilateral organisations. We should stress here that this kind of “perverse”
incentive is even more serious when associated to the multilaterals that should, at the
same time, both lend and monitor the actual implementation of the reforms (Ramcharan,
2002). However, to mitigate this conclusion it could also be that case that the element
of ”defense” is not necessarily related to the multilateral self-interest but it could also
depend on their concern for ﬁnancial stability.
Finally, we examine the interaction between loans and grants. The estimated regres-
sions show that net loans from both bilateral and multilateral creditors are not signiﬁ-
cantly related to previous-year grants from the same group of creditors (nor to loans by
other creditors). Bilateral creditors actually appear to reduce loans to countries that re-
ceive more grants from bilateral sources but this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
lending policy of multilateral organisations is also quantitatively unrelated to their aid
policy. This evidence suggests that, in spite of the concessional nature of most loans to
low-income countries, in general such loans are not viewed as strong substitutes of grants
by their givers. Incidentally, this supports our strategy of considering loans and grants
separately in the empirical analysis.
The interesting result that emerges from the analysis of the interaction between
multilateral and bilateral policy is the signiﬁcant ﬂow of multilateral loans into countries
that have received grants from bilateral don o r si nt h ep r e v i o u sy e a r . I n d e e d ,c o l u m n
3 shows that the eﬀect of bilateral grants on multilateral loans is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. This positive relation might reﬂect the concessional nature of multilateral loans that
could be provided to complement the aid policy of bilateral donors, but such explanation
is somewhat inconsistent with the evidence of the little role played by the recipients’
needs in motivating multilateral loans. The analysis of the determinants of bilateral and
multilateral grants will shed more light on this issue.12
Finally, we tested whether the results of the estimation of equation (3) are robust
to the exclusion of non signiﬁcant variables by sequentially excluding these variables.
Columns 2 and 4 report a more parsimonious speciﬁcation for the equations of bilateral
and multilateral net loans, respectively. As can be seen by comparing columns 1 and
2, the coeﬃcients of the variables explaining bilateral loans are remarkably stable across
12We tested whether the relation between multilateral net loans and bilateral grants diﬀers across
HIPCs and non-HIPCs, but the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of bilateral grants is the same for the two
groups of countries could not be rejected even at the 10% signiﬁcant level.
13speciﬁcations.13 The main changes concern openness that is now signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, and GDP growth that is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. With regard to multilateral
loans no signiﬁcant diﬀerences either in the size of the coeﬃcients or in their signiﬁcance
emerge across the two speciﬁcations, as shown by comparing columns 3 and 4.
4.2 Grants
We now turn to the analysis of the determinants of bilateral and multilateral grants
relative to GDP. Estimates of the grant equations (4) are presented in Table 7 for both
bilateral and multilateral grants. The explanatory variables also include debt forgiveness
to control for the fact that debt reductions, though classiﬁed as grants in the OECD
statistics, do not necessarily free additional resources to be used by debtor countries.
The high and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable in the bilateral
grants equation (see column 1) shows that bilateral grants are highly persistent. More
important, the ﬂow of grants that HIPCs receive from bilateral donors appears signif-
icantly more persistent than that received by non-HIPCs, as shown by the signiﬁcant
interaction between the HIPC dummy and the lagged dependent variable. This result
is an indication of the low quality of aid allocation: for any level of aid received in the
past, HIPCs tend to receive more aid today compared to non-HIPCs, despite their poorer
economic performance. As observed by Easterly (2002), aid to HIPCs tends to perpetuate
itself. The economic relevance of this eﬀect is however mild, as the coeﬃcient on lagged
grants for HIPCs is only 15% higher than for non-HIPCs. Multilateral grants exhibit a
much lower persistence compared to bilateral grants. Even in this case, however, grants
received by HIPCs are more persistent, as shown by the signiﬁcant interaction between
the HIPC dummy and the lagged dependent variable.14
Grants from bilateral donors are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by variables related to
recipients’ needs and economic performance. Column 1 shows that only ”Political Rights
and Civil Liberties” (PRCL) have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect, though at the 10%
level. Focusing on the behaviour of multilateral donors, column 3 shows that a low
growth performance, as measured by a low GDP growth, signiﬁcantly increases the ﬂow
of grants at the 1% level. The strong intervention of international organisations in low
growth environments is evidence of the importance of recipients’ need motivations in
their aid policy. Interestingly, and contrary to other results in the empirical literature
(e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Collier and Dollar, 2002), economic performance, as
measured by openness and inﬂation, does not seem to be a relevant factor of multilateral
aid.
A “post war” dummy displays a negative eﬀect on both bilateral and multilateral
grants, contrary to expectations, though it is signiﬁcant only in the bilateral grants equa-
13The exclusion of private debt from the equation of bilateral loans does not change this conclusion.
14As the coeﬃcient on lagged grants for HIPCs is about 20% higher than that for non-HIPCs the eﬀect
is similar to the case of bilateral grants even if its signiﬁcance is lower (at 10% level).
14tion. The fact that grants from either sources are, if anything, lower in the four years
following the end of a conﬂict is further evidence of a poor allocation of aid.15
The important evidence concerns the eﬀe c to ft h el e v e lo fd e b t( r e l a t i v et oG D P ) .
Column 1 shows that bilateral donors tend to reduce the amount of grants given to non-
HIPC low-income countries as their debt increase. This eﬀe c ti si n d e p e n d e n to ft h eh o l d e r
of the debt, but it is not signiﬁcant. On the contrary, HIPCs receive more grants from
bilateral donors as bilateral debt increases: the coeﬃcient of the variable that interacts
the HIPC dummy with bilateral debt is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This eﬀect
is economically relevant: while in the case of non-HIPCs a debt increase has no signiﬁcant
eﬀect, in the case of HIPCs an increase of bilateral debt of 10% of GDP increases grants
by almost 0.2% in the short run and by 0.5% of GDP in the long run.
Evidence of preferential treatment for HIPCs is even stronger when we look at the
estimated equation for multilateral grants in column 3. The amount of grants given
to non-HIPCs falls as the debt owed to multilateral creditors increases, as shown by a
coeﬃcient on multilateral debt that is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This
eﬀect disappears in the case of HIPCs where the coeﬃcient of the variable that interacts
multilateral debt with a dummy for being a HIPC is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. The long run impact of a higher debt is however lower than in the case of bilateral
grants: a 10% increase of multilateral debt in terms of GDP across all countries reduces
multilateral grants to non-HIPCs by 0.2% o fG D Pm o r et h a ni td o e si nH I P C si nt h e
short run and by 0.3% of GDP in the long run.
Therefore, the aid policy of both donor groups towards HIPC debtors is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from their policy towards non-HIPCs debtors. Evidence of a non-linear rela-
tion between grants and debt suggests that, at high levels of debt, a concern for debt
sustainability might motivate the aid policy of both bilateral and multilateral donors,
thereby supporting the hypothesis of ”defensive granting”. Importantly, debt ownership
debt seems an important determinant of the aid policy of both bilateral and multilateral
donors. The amount of grants that each donor group provides to HIPCs signiﬁcantly
increases with the stock of debt held by that group, while the impact of the debt held by
the other creditors is not signiﬁcant. This evidence provides further support to the hy-
pothesis of defensive granting. Because a positive relation between grants and debt only
emerges in the case of HIPCs, the hypothesis of ‘defensive granting’ appears to oﬀer a
more convincing explanation than humanitarian motivations for the positive link between
aid and debt. In fact, even if HIPCs are in more need than other low-income countries,
the presence of country-speciﬁce ﬀects should control for this motivation of aid.
The results in column 1 show that grants by bilateral donors are independent of
previous-year grants from multilateral organisations but tend to ﬂow into countries that
have received net loans from these institutions (multilateral loans are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level). A tentative explanation for this positive relation is that grants are usually given as
15To account for an eventual fall of aid during war years we also tried to include a dummy variable
taking the value of one during the years of war but this was not signiﬁcant neither in the net loans nor
in the grants equations.
15a part of a broader adjustment programme coordinated by multilateral organisations (at
least this is the case for programme aid or budget support). The adoption of an IMF or
World Bank programme could actually work either as a pre-condition for receiving grants
or it could signal a sound institutional and economic environment conducive to growth.
As multilateral grants are concerned, we ﬁnd that receiving a bilateral grant increases
the probability to obtain a multilateral grant in the following year, where this impact is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The two pieces of evidence are consistent with the results
presented in Table 6, namely that multilateral creditors signiﬁcantly direct their loans to
countries beneﬁting from bilateral grants.
The picture that emerges from the analysis of the interactions of bilateral and mul-
tilateral institutions is one where bilaterals try to decrease their debt exposure in HIPCs
by substituting grants for loans while multilateral organisations makes more loans and
grants available to these countries to help them escape the debt sustainability problem.
This may explain why both grants and loans of multilateral organisations strongly react
to bilateral grants. Moreover, while multilateral organisations follow the same aid and
lending strategy towards HIPCs, bilateral donors provide HIPCs with more grants while
reducing their net loans. This evidence suggests that, as the debt problem worsened,
bilateral donors may have used grants as substitutes for loans. It is worth noting that
this exchange of grants for loans is linked to the stock of bilateral debt while there is no
signiﬁcant relation between bilateral grants and net loans. These results thus raise the
concern that, in the case of HIPCs, bilateral aid has been used (or has freed up resources)
to service the external debt.
As the aid additionality issue is concerned, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of debt for-
giveness in the bilateral grants equation is signiﬁcant at 5% level and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀe r e n tf o rH I P C s . T h ef a c tt h a tt h i sc o e ﬃcient is negative and greater than one in
absolute value shows that debt forgiveness substantially reduces the ﬂow of grants in the
following year, independently of the type of country considered. The substitution of debt
reductions for money transfers is a cause of concern since it is likely to reduce the amount
of resources available to low-income countries (i.e. independently of being HIPCs or not).
We also tested whether the results of the estimation of the grant equation (4) are ro-
bust to the exclusion of non-signiﬁcant variables by sequentially excluding these variables.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 report a more parsimonious speciﬁcation for the equations
of bilateral and multilateral grants, respectively. As can be seen by comparing columns 1
and 2, former results for bilateral grants are conﬁrmed by the new estimates. If anything,
the new speciﬁcation implies a greater coeﬃcient for the interaction of the HIPC dummy
with bilateral debt. On the contrary, the new equation estimated for multilateral grants
presents a main diﬀerence relative to the baseline speciﬁcation. As seen by comparing
columns 3 and 4, the coeﬃcient on private debt is now positive and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. Except for this role of private debt in attracting multilateral grants, there are no
other signiﬁcant diﬀerences either in the size of the coeﬃcients of the other variables or
in their signiﬁcance.
Finally, since the quality of the institutions has recently been found as a key aspect in
16determining economic development (see, among others, Knack and Kneefer, 1995, Mauro,
1995, Easterly and Levine, 2002) we would expect that a good quality of institutions
be a potential factor motivating aid allocation. To test for this we have augmented our
speciﬁcation with the indexes of Bureaucracy Quality, Corruption, Law and Order and
Investment Proﬁle from the ICRG. Since such indexes are probably highly correlated we
use each indicator in isolation. The introduction of these proxies of ”good quality” of
institutions comes at the cost of restricting our sample to only 38 countries and to the
period 1984 to 1999, but produces disappointing results as the coeﬃcients of the indexes
of institutional quality are never signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding can be explained with the fact
that our sample of countries is rather homogeneous with respect to the (poor) quality of
their institutions. Since institutions do not appear to be a factor in aid allocation across
HIPCs countries, results obtained for the full sample of 52 countries appear more reliable.
4.3 Selecting HIPCs
One may actually worry that there is a (sub)sample selection bias because HIPCs were
classiﬁed as such only in 1996 (on the basis of data for the year 1993) and not at the
beginning of the sample. It is, however, worth noting that our results imply that, if
HIPCs had not been highly indebted at the beginning of the sample, they could not have
become highly indebted, and thus classiﬁed as HIPCs, because of defensive lending. In
fact, had the debt ratio of HIPCs been lower at the beginning of the sample, they would
have received lower loans from the international community.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we re-estimated equations (3) and (4)
using another dichotomic variable as a proxy of high indebtedness in place of the HIPC
dummy. Speciﬁcally, we constructed a dummy called HDEGC (high debt to export and
to GDP) which is equal to one (and remain such) once a country reaches either a value
of its debt to export ratio greater than 220% or a value of its debt to GDP ratio greater
than 80% in the sample period. These criteria are similar to those used to classify a
low-income country as HIPC in 1996, namely a value of the 1993 present value of debt
to exports higher than 220% or present value of debt to GNP higher than 80% (e.g. see
The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Review and Outlook, 1998).16
The results of the estimation of the equations for bilateral and multilateral net loans
and grants, using the HDEGC dummy in place of the HIPC dummy, are presented in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 8. Previous results for both bilateral and multilateral loans
are generally conﬁrmed by the new estimates. As shown in column 1, most variables
related to recipients’ needs and economic performance do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect bilateral
loans, except for GDP growth and the degree of openness. More important, a higher
stock of bilateral debt still appears to reduce bilateral net loans, as the coeﬃcient on the
bilateral debt is marginally signiﬁcant at the 10% level. However, it is worth noting that
evidence of a negative relation between net loans and debt is independent of the degree of
16The original list of HIPCs also included nine countries that had received concessional rescheduling
from Paris Club creditors or were potentially eligible for such rescheduling.
17indebtedness, as captured by the HDEGC dummy. In fact, the interaction of the HEDG
dummy with bilateral debt is not signiﬁcant, unlike for estimates using the HIPC dummy.
As multilateral loans are concerned, the results presented in column 2 conﬁrm the
preferential treatment obtained by high-debt countries relative to low-debt countries. In
particular, while a higher share of debt owed to multilateral creditors tends to reduce
t h ea m o u n to ft h e i rl o a n st ol o w - d e b tc o u n t r i e s ,t h eo p p o s i t eh o l d st r u ei nt h ec a s eo f
high-debt countries as deﬁned by the HDEGC dummy. Indeed, a higher multilateral debt
signiﬁcantly increases the amount of loans given to the former group at the 1% level. This
eﬀect disappears in the case of high-debt countries; the coeﬃcient on the interaction of
the HDEGC dummy with multilateral debt is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
This evidence still points to defensive lending as the main motivation for the behavior of
multilateral creditors.
The results of the estimation of the equations for bilateral and multilateral grants
using the HDEGC dummy are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8. Under the new
classiﬁcation of highly indebted countries, therei sn oe v i d e n c eo fd e f e n s i v eg r a n t i n g .A s
shown in column 3, bilateral grants appear to be unrelated to any debt variable either
taken in isolation or interacted with the HDEGC dummy. Column 4 shows that multi-
lateral grants signiﬁcantly decrease with the stock of multilateral debt but this eﬀect is
independent of the country group: the interaction of the HDEGC dummy with multilat-
eral debt is positive but not signiﬁcant.
Therefore, while we ﬁnd further evidence of defensive lending by multilateral organ-
isations, the hypothesis of defensive granting is not supported by the new classiﬁcation
of highly indebted countries. However, we have shown above that HIPCs did beneﬁto f
a preferential treatment from oﬃcial donors as the amount of grants they received was
increasing with their debt level. This suggests that such a preferential treatment may
have been motivated by other speciﬁc characteristics of HIPCs than the sheer size of their
debt. Following Easterly (2002), we may think that the selection of HIPCs is justiﬁed by
t h ef a c tt h a tt h e ya r et h ec o u n t r i e st h eo ﬃcial institutions targeted their eﬀorts to. To the
extent that this selection was not only based on debt sustainability indicators, but also
included countries that had received concessional rescheduling from Paris Club creditors
(see footnote 16), our results would reﬂect these additional motivations and point to the
existence of ’selective defensive granting’.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have examined the determinants of net loans and grants to low-income
countries, focusing on the highly indebted and poor ones. We estimate a dynamic panel
of 52 low-income countries, for the period 1982 to 1999, by GLS with country-speciﬁc
eﬀects and time eﬀects.
We ﬁnd that a higher level of bilateral debt reduces bilateral net loans to HIPCs, while
18multilateral creditors appear strikingly more generous in the case of HIPCs (contrary to
the results of Birdswall et al. 2002 who ﬁnd bilateral creditors more responsible for low
selectivity). In particular, while a higher stock of debt owed to multilateral creditors tends
to reduce the amount of their loans to non-HIPCs, this eﬀect disappears in the case of
HIPCs. The amount of loans received by HIPCs increases, compared to non-HIPCs, with
their level of multilateral debt. This evidence points to defensive lending as the main
motivation for the behaviour of multilateral organisations where this kind of perverse
incentive is even more serious when associated to the multilaterals that should, at the
same time, both lending and monitoring the actual implementation of the reforms.
The aid policy of both bilateral and multilateral donors also appears more generous
with HIPC than with non-HIPC countries, thereby supporting the hypothesis of ”defensive
granting”. The amount of grants that each donor type provides to HIPCs signiﬁcantly
increases, compared to non-HIPCs, with its corresponding debt share.
Therefore, the results of our analysis shows that the net transfers that HIPCs have
received, compared to non-HIPCs, have been increasing with their level of debt. Greater
net transfers have taken the form of loans from multilateral organisations and grants in
exchange for loans from bilateral institutions. As the HIPC dummy stands for an indicator
of high debt, this evidence suggests that HIPCs have kept receiving a large amount of net
resources just because of their high degree of indebtedness, thereby supporting both the
hypothesis of defensive lending and granting.
Finally, as the aid additionality issue is concerned, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
of debt forgiveness in the bilateral grants equation, independently of the type of country
considered. The substitution of debt reductions for net loans is a cause of concern since
it is likely to reduce the amount of resources available to all low-income countries, that is
including those countries which are not under scrutiny for the debt relief initiative.
In terms of policy implications there is a main conclusion that we can draw from our
analysis. Since the concern for keeping the debt sustainable (or more generally the need
to avoid a debt crisis) seems to have been the key issue of HIPCs (multilateral) creditors
and donors, then a strong debt stock reduction should encourage a greater selectivity in
assigning grants and loans to countries in need. More selectivity, in turn, would provide
debtors with better incentives, since they would not anticipate anymore that lenders would
lend them anyway.
On this respect the HIPCs Initiative, which for the ﬁrst time include multilateral
creditors in the analysis, has the merit to provide multilaterals with further incentives in
being selective when approving their loans (i.e. by making them paying a price for the
debt reduction for the ﬁrst time).
Bilateral donors would also be encouraged towards a greater use of selectivity in their
grants assignment by a reduced debt stock. Actually, in the latter case, the evidence we
ﬁnd against the debt additionality hypothesis could actually suggest that grants would
strongly decrease just as a direct consequence of the debt reduction. But, at least for the
multilaterals, this caveat should not apply.
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21Table 1: List of all low income countries  
1)    Afghanistan  35)  Lesotho 
2)    Angola  36)  Liberia 
3)    Armenia  37)  Madagascar 
4)    Azerbaijan  38)  Malawi 
5)    Bangladesh  39)  Mali 
6)    Benin  40)  Mauritania 
7)    Bhutan  41)  Moldova 
8)    Bolivia  42)  Mongolia 
9)    Burkina Faso  43)  Mozambique 
10)  Burundi  44)  Myanmar 
11)  Cambodia  45)  Nepal 
12)  Cameroon  46)  Nicaragua 
13)  Central African Rep.  47)  Niger 
14)  Chad  48)  Nigeria 
15)  Comoros  49)  Pakistan 
16)  Congo, Dem. Rep. of  50)  Rwanda 
17)  Congo, Republic of  51)  São Tomé & Príncipe 
18)  Côte d'Ivoire  52)  Senegal 
19)  Eritrea  53)  Sierra Leone 
20)  Ethiopia  54)  Solomon Islands 
21)  Gambia, The  55)  Somalia 
22)  Georgia  56)  Sudan 
23)  Ghana  57)  Tajikistan 
24)  Guinea  58)  Tanzania 
25)  Guinea-Bissau  59)  Togo 
26)  Guyana  60)  Turkmenistan 
27)  Haiti  61)  Uganda 
28)  Honduras  62)  Ukraine 
29)  India  63)  Uzbekistan 
30)  Indonesia  64)  Vietnam 
31)  Kenya  65)  Yemen, Republic of 
32)  Korea DPR  66)  Zambia 
33)  Kyrgyz Republic  67)  Zimbabwe 
34)  Lao People's Dem.Rep  68)  Lesotho 
Source: World Bank, GDF CD-ROM, 2001  
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Source: HIPCs Initiative country documents, IMF and WB. Table 4: Variables definition 
Variable Definition  Units 
Multilateral Grants  Multilateral Grants  Ratio to GDP 
Bilateral Grants  Bilateral Grants  Ratio to GDP 
Multilateral Net Loans  Mul Net Loan+IMF Net Loans  Ratio to GDP 
Bilateral Net Loans  Bilateral Net Loan  Ratio to GDP 
Private Net Loans  Private Net Loan  Ratio to GDP 
Population Population  Billions  units 
Pc-GDP   Gross Domestic Product  Ratio to Population (thousands units) 
Inflation  Consumer Price Index  Annual Rate of change 
Gr-GDP  Real GDP growth  Annual Rate of change 
Openness  Imports+Exports  Ratio to GDP 
PRCL  Political Right&Civil Liberties  Average Index 
Multilateral Debt  Long term Mul Debt+IMF Debt  Ratio to GDP 
Bilateral Debt  Long term Bilateral Debt  Ratio to GDP 
Private Debt  Long term Bilateral Debt  Ratio to GDP 
Debt Forgiven  Debt Forgiveness  Ratio to GDP 
Bureaucracy quality  Bureaucracy quality  Index 
Corruption Corruption  Index   
Inv Profile  Investment profile  Index  
Law & Order  Law & Order  Index  
Dummy Post War  Years of post conflict  Binary Table 5: Data source 
Variable Source 
Bilateral & Multilateral Grants   DAC (OECD) 
Debt Forgiveness  DAC (OECD) 
Total Grants  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Multilateral Net Loans  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bilateral Net Loans  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Private Net Loans  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Population  International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Pc-GDP   World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Inflation   World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Gr-GDP   World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Openness   World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties  Freedom House 
Multilateral Debt  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bilateral Debt  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Private Debt  Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Bureaucracy quality  ICRG 
Corruption ICRG 
Inv Profile  ICRG 
Law & Order  ICRG 
Dummy War/Post War  Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
 TABLE 6: Net Loans with interactions with HIPC 








Population  0.0229** 0.0257** -0.0243  -0.0231 
  (2.073) (2.208) (1.610) (1.620) 
Per capita GDP (-1)  -0.0031    -0.0013   
 (1.282)    (0.445)   
Inflation (-1)  0.0001    0.00001   
 (1.224)    (0.393)   
GDP Growth (-1)  -0.0192**  -0.0195***  0.0158**  0.0183** 
  (2.459) (2.599) (2.040) (2.358) 
Openness (-1)  0.0055*  0.0062**  0.0005   
  (1.820) (2.397) (0.216)  
PRCL   -0.0003    0.0002   
 (0.929)    (0.487)   
Multilateral Debt (-1)  -0.0035    -0.0686***  -0.0673*** 
 (0.392)    (6.295)  (6.833) 
Bilateral  Debt  (-1)  -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0007  
  (0.849) (0.720) (0.332)  
Private Debt (-1)  -0.0237  -0.0201  0.0081   
  (1.505) (1.377) (0.734)  
HIPC x Multilater. Debt (-1)   0.0027    0.0433***  0.0449*** 
 (0.307)    (4.103)  (4.874) 
HIPC x Bilateral Debt (-1)   -0.0181***  -0.0142***  0.0034   
  (4.487) (4.082) (0.985)  
HIPC x Private Debt (-1)   0.0257  0.0231  -0.0102   
  (1.543) (1.505) (0.883)  
Multilateral Net Loans (-1)  0.0246    0.5116***  0.5124*** 
 (1.160)    (17.292)  (17.752) 
Bilateral Net Loans (-1)  0.5014***  0.5190***  0.0115   
  (16.572) (18.104) (0.530)   
Private Net Loans (-1)  0.0223    0.0268   
 (0.870)    (1.531)   
Multilateral Grants (-1)  -0.0011    -0.0092   
 (0.086)    (0.777)   
Bilateral Grants (-1)  -0.0091    0.0875***  0.0861*** 
 (0.677)    (6.550)  (6.788) 
Dummy Post War  -0.0005    -0.0013   
 (0.250)    (0.718)   
Constant  0.0025 0.0025 -0.00004  -0.0020 
  (0.405) (0.572) (0.009) (0.975) 
Observations  936 936 936 936 
Number  of  countries  52 52 52 52 
Number  of  years  18 18 18 18 
SE  of  regression  0.0257 0.0256 0.0259 0.0257 
SE of Dependent variable   0.0386  0.0386  0.0388  0.0388 
Time Dummies  









Country Dummie  









Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors. Each equation contains country dummies and 
time dummies. TABLE 7 : Grants with interactions with HIPC  
  Bilateral Grants  Bilateral Grants  Multilateral Grants  Multilateral Grants 
Population  -0.0160   -0.0077  
  (0.613)   (0.470)  
Per capita GDP (-1)  -0.0056  -0.0060*  -0.0026  -0.0027* 
  (1.529) (1.833)  (1.385) (1.668) 
Inflation  (-1)  0.00002   0.00002  
  (0.338)   (0.791)  
GDP Growth (-1)  0.0148    -0.0272***  -0.0327*** 
  (1.132)   (4.472) (6.082) 
Openness  (-1)  -0.0007   -0.0007  
  (0.209)   (0.443)  
PRCL   0.0009*  0.0010*  -0.0003   
  (1.672) (1.871)  (1.448)  
Multilateral Debt (-1)  -0.0164  -0.0118*  -0.0229***  -0.0240*** 
  (1.170) (1.774)  (3.391) (3.921) 
Bilateral Debt (-1)  -0.0038  -0.0054  -0.0007   
  (0.917) (1.395)  (0.152)  
Private Debt (-1)  -0.0071    -0.0054  0.0050*** 
  (0.463)   (0.622) (2.994) 
HIPC x Multilater. Debt (-1)   0.0049    0.0190***  0.0196*** 
  (0.344)   (2.866) (3.341) 
HIPC x Bilateral Debt (-1)   0.0156***  0.0169***  -0.0007   
  (2.650) (3.070)  (0.147)  
HIPC x Private Debt (-1)   0.0042    0.0112   
  (0.250)   (1.200)  
Multilateral Net Loans (-1)  0.1051***  0.1033***  0.0113   
  (2.806) (2.781)  (0.744)  
Bilateral Net Loans (-1)  0.0381    0.0013   
  (1.108)   (0.110)  
Private Net Loans (-1)  0.0354    0.0118   
  (1.097)   (0.941)  
Multilateral Grants (-1)  0.0196    0.3088***  0.3188*** 
 (0.824)    (11.878)  (12.306) 
HIPC x Multilateral Grants (-1)      0.0690*  0.0559 
     (1.785)  (1.522) 
Bilateral Grants (-1)  0.5989***  0.5969***  0.0720***  0.0624*** 
 (16.217)  (16.744)  (5.733)  (6.276) 
HIPC x Bilateral Grants (-1)  0.0925***  0.0986***     
 (2.703)  (2.981)     
Debt Forgiven (-1)  -1.3087**  -1.3954**  -0.1321   
  (2.239) (2.462)  (0.926)  
HIPC x Debt Forgiven (-1)  0.7564  0.8564  0.1142   
  (1.290) (1.506)  (0.808)  
Dummy Post War  -0.0053*  -0.0054*  -0.0012   
  (1.679) (1.784)  (0.747)  
Constant  0.0104 0.0125**  0.0005 0.0040* 
  (1.300) (2.159)  (0.127) (1.888) 
Observations 936  936  936  936 
Number of countries  52  52  52  52 
Number of years  18  18  18  18 
SE of regression  0.0396  0.0395  0.0186  0.0185 
SE of Dependent variable   0.0797  0.07967  0.0430  0.0430 
















Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors. Each equation contains country dummies and 
time dummies. TABLE 8: Net Loans and Grants with interactions with HDEGC 
  Bilateral Net Loans  Mul Net Loans  Bilateral Grants  Mul Grants 
Population 0.0244*  -0.0309**  -0.0265  -0.0073 
 (1.937)  (2.047)  (0.964)  (0.475) 
Pc-GDP  (-1)  -0.0017  -0.0019 -0.0059 -0.0025 
 (0.636)  (0.634)  (1.533)  (1.330) 
Inflation  (-1)  0.0001  0.00002 0.00002 0.00001 
 (1.157)  (0.632)  (0.426)  (0.633) 
Gr-GDP (-1)  -0.0216***  0.0175**  0.0163  -0.0250*** 
 (2.758)  (2.123)  (1.185)  (4.121) 
Openness  (-1)  0.0058**  -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0001 
 (1.965)  (0.426)  (0.512)  (0.042) 
PRCL   -0.0004  0.0003  0.0011*  -0.0002 
 (1.136)  (0.940)  (1.934)  (1.010) 
Multilateral Debt Share (-1)  0.0016  -0.0490***  -0.0241  -0.0147* 
 (0.204)  (4.818)  (1.458)  (1.944) 
Bilateral Debt Share (-1)  -0.0189  0.0231*  0.0230  0.0131 
 (1.636)  (1.884)  (1.122)  (1.311) 
Private Debt Share (-1) -0.0141  0.0356***  0.0046  0.0062 
 (1.000)  (3.057)  (0.251)  (0.709) 
HDEG x Mul Debt Share (-1)  -0.0053  0.0220**  0.0167  0.0091 
 (0.771)  (2.484)  (1.128)  (1.326) 
HDEG x Bilateral Debt Share (-1) 0.0064  -0.0215*  -0.0167  -0.0137 
 (0.565)  (1.771)  (0.821)  (1.383) 
HDEG x Private Debt Share (-1) 0.0126  -0.0335***  -0.0068  -0.0034 
 (0.950)  (3.022)  (0.394)  (0.406) 
Multilateral Net Loans (-1)  0.0252  0.4931***  0.1065***  0.0031 
 (1.190)  (16.475)  (2.774)  (0.204) 
Bilateral Net Loans (-1)  0.4946***  0.0019  0.0329  -0.0042 
 (16.330)  (0.088)  (0.959)  (0.384) 
Private Net Loans (-1)  0.0296  0.0190  0.0354  0.0144 
 (1.194)  (0.881)  (1.098)  (1.131) 
Multilateral Grants (-1)  -0.0063  -0.0024  0.0502  0.2550*** 
 (0.354)  (0.179)  (1.600)  (9.841) 
HDEG x Multilateral Grants (-1)        0.1863*** 
      (4.773) 
Bilateral Grants (-1)  -0.0124  0.0899***  0.6542***  0.0625*** 
     (13.250)  (4.988) 
Bilateral HDEG  Grants (-1)      -0.0009   
     (0.019)   
Debt Forgiven (-1)       -1.0866  0.0682 
     (1.096)  (0.173) 
HDEG x Debt Forgiven (-1)      0.5100  -0.0731 
 (0.890)  (6.392)  (0.514)  (0.186) 
Dummy Post War  -0.0000  -0.0016  -0.0042  -0.0007 
 (0.027)  (0.798)  (1.244)  (0.427) 
Constant  0.0023  0.0001 0.0103 0.0022 
 (0.395)  (0.014)  (1.292)  (0.569) 
Observations  936  936 936 936 
Number of countries  52  52  52  52 
Number of years  18  18  18  18 
SE of regression  0.0257  0.0259  0.0401  0.0184 
SE of Dependent variable   0.0386  0.0388  0.0797  0.0430 
















Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Generalised least squares allowing for heteroskedastic errors. Each equation contains country dummies and 
time dummies.   
FIGURE 1 
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